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Abstract
The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) is a key hub of the ‘social brain’, but little is known about specific processes
supported by this region. Using focal high-definition transcranial direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS) and a social cognitive
battery with differing demands on self-other processing, we demonstrate specific involvement of the dmPFC in tasks placing
high demands on self-other processing. Specifically, excitatory (anodal) HD-tDCS enhanced the integration of external infor-
mation into the self for explicit higher-order socio-cognitive tasks across cognitive domains; i.e. visual perspective taking (VPT)
and episodic memory. These effects were task specific, as no stimulation effects were found for attributing mental states from
the eyes or implicit VPT. Inhibitory (cathodal) HD-tDCS had weaker effects in the opposite direction towards reduced integra-
tion of external information into the self. We thus demonstrate for the first time a specific and causal role of the dmPFC in
integrating higher-order information from others/external source into that of the self across cognitive domains.
Key words: high definition tDCS; perspective-taking; self-other processing; self-reference effect; theory of mind
Social cognition refers to a wide range of abilities that facilitate
social functioning. A fundamental aspect of human social behav-
iour involves the ability to distinguish the self from others and
attributing the behaviour and actions of others to underlying,
unobservable mental states (Decety and Sommerville, 2003). At
one level we must distinguish the ‘self’ from ‘other’ and under-
stand that perspectives or beliefs differ accordingly. However, the
notion of self and other are not necessarily independent, with
some arguing that a mergence of these perspectives is necessary
to empathise and attribute mental states to others (Cialdini et al.,
1997). For example, if another person is present in a scene during
perspective taking tasks, people implicitly judge a scene from the
perspective of that person (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Samson
et al., 2010; Tversky and Hard, 2009). This implicit, automatic
representation of another’s perspective is a developmental foun-
dation for explicit perspective taking, where subjects are able to
inhibit the egocentric perspective (from the self) in order to adopt
an allocentric perspective (in reference to an external position,
Flavell, 1977; Gzesh and Surber, 1985; Moll and Tomasello, 2004).
Moreover, perspective taking is a developmental precursor for
other aspects of higher-order social cognition such as empathy
and theory of mind (ToM, Hamilton et al., 2009). There is also evi-
dence that the mental constructs of ‘self’ and ‘other’ bias cogni-
tive processing in other domains. One such example is the
biasing of memories for information related to the individual,
which results in superior recall for items encoded in relation to or
of importance to the ‘self’ (i.e. the self-referential effect, Symons
and Johnson, 1997).
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The core regions of the social brain have been well charac-
terised and involve midline structures such as the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (pCC),
bilateral temporoparietal junctions (TPJ), superior temporal
lobes and temporal poles (Adolphs, 2009). However little is
known about the specific processes supported by these regions.
In particular, functional imaging studies have consistently
shown activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC)
during tasks requiring higher order social judgements that
incorporate several sources of information (Denny et al., 2012;
Schurz et al., 2014). For example, it is involved in integrating
information relevant for social judgements (Brosch et al., 2013;
Ferrari et al., 2016) with a role in merging information pertaining
to the self and other in order to guide decision-making
(Wittmann et al., 2016). The mPFC, more generally, is activated
during both ToM and visual perspective taking (VPT) tasks
(Schurz et al., 2015), providing neural evidence to support a con-
ceptual link (Hamilton et al., 2009). During VPT tasks, dmPFC
activation was greatest during egocentric perspective tasks, but
only when the allocentric perspective was incongruent (Schurz
et al., 2015). Social cognitive measures that do not involve incor-
porating several sources of information, such as social anima-
tion judgments or the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task
(RMET), do not consistently involve the dmPFC (Schurz et al.,
2014). A further distinction of the dmPFC is between the two lev-
els of social cognitive processing, implicit and explicit (Frith and
Frith, 2008). Only higher-order social tasks that require complex
representations correlate with activity in the dmPFC (Amodio
and Frith, 2006; Rilling et al., 2004; Volz et al., 2009) and although
implicit processes also activate core mentalising regions, the
dmPFC is only involved when intentional explicit judgements
are required (Van Overwalle and Vandekerckhove, 2013).
However, mapping the ‘social brain’ by functional imaging
techniques only provides correlational evidence for brain–
behaviour relationships. Causal inferences can be achieved
using non-invasive brain stimulation techniques such as trans-
cranial direct current stimulation (tDCS; for review see Sellaro
et al., 2016). However, previous studies that stimulated the social
brain all relied on non-focal (‘conventional’) set-ups that pre-
clude strong assumptions regarding the underlying neural
effects. In contrast, novel high-definition tDCS (HD-tDCS) set-
ups allow the administration of a current with higher spatial
precision, resulting in focal neural modulation (for review see
Alam et al., 2016) and regionally specific behavioural modulation
(Gbadeyan et al., 2016b).
To assess the specific role of the dmPFC in social cognitive
tasks requiring self and other distinction, we designed a battery
consisting of, (i) an emotion recognition test—RMET that only
required considering the mental state of another person, (ii) a
VPT test that measured implicit and explicit perspective taking
from both an egocentric (self) and allocentric (external) view-
point (avatar or traffic light), across three levels of perspective
taking (implicit, level one and level two) and (iii) a recognition
episodic memory test for items encoded in relation to the sub-
ject or another person (Barack Obama; SRE, Figure 1 illustrates
the design of the study). In two separate groups of participants
we employed a sham-controlled, crossover, double-blinded
design to assess the effects of either excitatory (‘anodal’) or
inhibitory (‘cathodal’) HD-tDCS over the dmPFC. If the dmPFC is
recruited when integrating social information from the other to
the self, we expect to see significant stimulation effects during
the VPT explicit, egocentric conditions such that anodal HD-
tDCS will increase the integration of the allocentric perspective
into that of the egocentric. During the episodic memory task,
anodal HD-tDCS will result in greater salience for other encoded
memories, removing or reducing the SRE. As the RMET does not
involve integrating self with other to the same extent, we expect
no differences on performance following anodal HD-tDCS. The
opposite effects were expected for cathodal HD-tDCS.
Materials and methods
Study outline
The study timeline is presented in Figure 1. In brief, participants
first completed the RMET and for each mental attribute selected
participants were asked how often they (self) or Barack Obama
(other) felt that way. This was followed by the visual perspective
tasks in the order: level one implicit, level one explicit and level
two explicit. Finally, the recognition episodic memory test for
the selected mental attribute words and gender of the stimuli
from the RMET. Prior to testing, all subjects completed a safety
screening form outlining the project and any safety/risk issues
pertaining to tDCS. Subjects completed a written consent form
in accordance with Declaration of Helsinki (1991; p. 1194). The
ethics committee of the University of Queensland granted ethi-
cal approval. In order to familiarise the subjects with Barack
Obama, they initially viewed a short (5 min) documentary on
his life and career. To engage them with the task, participants
were instructed that their responses would be compared with
those collected from people working with Barack Obama. The
Visual Analogue of Mood Scales (VAMS, Folstein and Luria,
1973) was acquired before and after stimulation. The Autism
Fig. 1. An overview of the study. (A) The HD-tDCS was administered to the
dmPFC [MNI co-ordinates 0/54/33, taken from the peak activity associated with
ToM in the meta-analysis (Schurz et al., 2014)]. (B) During anodal HD-tDCS the
centre electrode was the anode and the ring electrode the cathode. The polar-
ities were swapped during cathodal HD-tDCS. (C) An outline of the study proce-
dure. After consent and safety screening, pre-stimulation Visual Analogue of
Mood Scales (VAMS) was completed followed by the Autism Spectrum Quotient
(ASQ). Then, subjects watched a 5 min documentary about Barack Obama. The
tasks were then administered in the following order: Reading the Mind in the
Eyes (RMET) mental attribution, self/other encoding, RMET age and gender judg-
ments, VPT level one implicit, VPT level one explicit, VPT level two explicit. Self
or other encoding of memory was manipulated by asking the subject ‘how often
do you think or feel this way?’ or ‘how often does Barack Obama think or feel
this way?’ The VPT task lasted 20 min. Subjects were then asked whether they
previously saw the mental state in the eyes (1¼definitely did, 2¼probably did,
3¼probably not, 4¼definitely not). Source memory was measured by asking
whether it was on a male or female face (1¼definitely male, 2¼probably male,
3¼probably female, 4¼definitely female). Following testing subjects completed
the post-stimulation VAMS, adverse effects questionnaire, and baseline cogni-
tive testing.
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Spectrum Quotient (ASQ, Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was adminis-
tered before the first session and the neuropsychological testing
was divided between the two sessions and completed following
the social cognitive testing.
Participants
40 healthy young adults aged between 18 and 35 were recruited
for the study. 20 each were stratified by sex and assigned to the
sham-controlled anodal or cathodal HD-tDCS, double-blinded,
crossover studies. The groups were comparable on neuropsy-
chological functioning, the ASQ and the Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond and Snaith, 1983; see Table
S3). All subjects were tDCS-naive, were not currently taking psy-
choactive medication, and had no diagnosis of neurological or
psychiatric disorder. All participants provided written consent
prior to inclusion, completed a safety-screening questionnaire
and were compensated with AUD$50.
Apparatus
All tasks were presented on a 51 33 cm monitor using a stand-
ard keyboard. All tasks were presented using Cogent2000 v1.33.
tDCS
The stimulation was administered using a one-channel direct
current stimulator (DC-Stimulator PlusVR , NeuroConn) and two
concentric rubber electrodes (Bortoletto et al., 2016; Gbadeyan
et al., 2016c). A small centre electrode (diameter: 2.5 cm) and a
ring-shaped return electrode (diameter inner/outer: 9.2/11.5 cm)
were used (see Figure 1). The set-up is a variation of the ‘4 1’
HD-tDCS set-up, which constrains the current by using four
return electrodes that are arranged in a circle around the centre
electrode (Alam et al., 2016; Hogeveen et al., 2016; Kuo et al.,
2013). Safety, effective behavioural modulation and focal cur-
rent delivery have been demonstrated for both montages, but
the concentric set-up was chosen because it does not require an
expensive multi-channel stimulator (Bortoletto et al., 2016;
Gbadeyan et al., 2016c). Electrodes were attached over the target
region using an adhesive conductive gel (Weaver Ten20VR con-
ductive paste) and held in place with an EEG cap to ensure a sta-
ble conductive adhesion with the skin. The position of the
centre electrode was determined using the 10–20 international
EEG system. First FPz and Fz were located and the distance
between measured. The scalp region overlying the dmPFC was
located by measuring 15% of the distance from the Fz towards
the FPz. This approximated the MNI coordinates (0/54/33),
which corresponds to the peak activity in the ToM meta-
analysis conducted by Schurz et al. (2014). The ring electrode
was positioned symmetrically around the centre electrode.
In all stimulation conditions, the current was ramped up to
1 mA over 15 s prior to commencement of the experiment. In
the active stimulation conditions (anodal & cathodal) HD-tDCS
was administered for 20 min before ramping down. In the ano-
dal HD-tDCS condition, the centre electrode was the anode and
the ring electrode was the cathode. The polarities were
switched for the cathodal HD-tDCS condition. During sham HD-
tDCS, the current was ramped down after 15 s, which elicits a
physical sensation on the scalp, mimicking that of the active
stimulation, to assure participants were blinded to the experi-
mental condition, without modulating neural function.
Researchers were blinded to the experimental condition by
using the ‘study-mode’ of the DC-stimulator (i.e. a pre-assigned
code triggered the respective stimulation conditions).
Social cognitive tests
RMET. The RMET (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is considered a
measure of affective ToM functioning, although recently
conceptualised as a measure of emotion recognition (Oakley
et al., 2016). A set of eyes were presented with four mental attri-
bution words surrounding (see Figure 2). The RMET was modi-
fied so that each response only appeared once. Extra trials were
included in order to balance out the gender ratio of the eyes.
Subjects were instructed to choose the mental attribution that
was best represented in the eyes. Following this, for the pur-
poses of the later memory test, subjects were then asked, ‘how
often they felt that way?’ (self-encoding) or ‘how often they
thought Barack Obama felt or thought that way?’ (other-encod-
ing). The responses were on a four-point scale (1¼very often,
2¼ fairly often, 3¼ rarely, 4¼very rarely). Subjects were then
asked to judge the age and sex of the person in the picture,
again on a four-point scale (1¼ young male, 2¼young female,
3¼old man, 4¼old woman). Old was considered >50 years of
age. There was no time limit on responding and the next stimu-
lus was presented as soon as a response was recorded.
Accuracy scores were computed for the mental attributions and
age and sex judgments (total correct out of 38).
VPT tasks. The VPT task involved three separate tests meas-
uring level one VPT (implicit and explicit) and level two VPT
(explicit). All tests involved a street scene with tennis balls, rub-
bish bins, and either a human avatar or a traffic light directly in
front of the gaze of the subject at one of three positions on the
street—far, middle or near (see Figure 2). The traffic light was
used as a directional control that should direct attention in a
similar manner to the human avatar, but crucially without the
ability to hold a perspective of the scene, which was particularly
of interest in the implicit VPT task (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009;
Samson et al., 2010). The test consisted of 176 trials. In 50% of
the trials (n¼ 88) a human avatar was present and in 50% of the
trials a traffic light was present. The trials were further sepa-
rated (50% each, resulting in 44 trials in each condition) by
whether the number of balls seen by the subject was congruent
or incongruent with that of the human avatar’s view or the
number of tennis balls the light would directly hit. This resulted
in four conditions; avatar congruent, avatar incongruent, light
congruent, light incongruent (see Figure 2). All conditions were
balanced for number and location of tennis balls. Each VPT had
four counterbalanced versions and subjects were presented
with different versions between sessions. All tests were com-
pleted in the order; level one implicit, level one explicit and
level two explicit. Subjects were instructed to answer as quickly
and as accurately as possible. The stimuli remained on the
screen until a response was recorded. A fixation cross was pre-
sented for 500 ms prior to the stimuli. For the level one and level
two VPT, the word ‘you’ or ‘other’ was presented for 750 ms
prior to the presentation of the scene. Subjects were informed
that tennis balls would be hidden from the avatar’s view if a
rubbish bin occluded the view or if the tennis ball was behind
the avatar. If the traffic light was present, the subjects were
instructed to imagine the light radiating out from the traffic
light towards the subject and to answer how many tennis balls
the light would directly hit. Again, if a bin occluded the light or
if the ball was behind the traffic light then the light would not
directly hit the ball.
Only the response times for the VPT tasks are of interest in
the current study. The VPT tasks were designed to keep errors
low. However, anodal or cathodal stimulation had no impact
on error rates. This excludes the possibility that there was a
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speed-accuracy trade-off underlying the effects on response
time.
Visual perspective task—level one implicit. In the first test sub-
jects were instructed to respond as fast and accurately as possi-
ble with ‘how many tennis balls can you see?’ The answer was
always between one and four with the response buttons clearly
marked on the keyboard. The task was considered an implicit
test, as subjects were not directed to consider the perspective
from the perspective of the avatar in the scene and were only
required to answer from the egocentric perspective.
Visual perspective task—level one explicit. In the level one
explicit task, participants were required to take either an ego-
centric perspective or the allocentric perspective from the ava-
tar or light and answer how many tennis balls could be seen/
light would directly shine on. There were four possible
responses for each condition, with one to four tennis balls for
the egocentric judgements allocentric congruent conditions. In
order to maintain four choices for the allocentric incongruent
condition, without increasing the number of balls in the scene,
scenes with zero balls visible to the avatar/light were included.
Therefore, answers in this condition were from zero to three.
Visual perspective task—level two explicit. In the level two
explicit VPT task, participants were again required to take either
an egocentric perspective or the allocentric perspective of the
avatar or light. However, this task required making a judgement
on ‘how’ the subject or other avatar views the scene, by asking
them ‘whether they/other could see/light would shine on, more
balls on the left, right, or equal number on each side of the
road?’ All conditions had three possible responses.
Self-referential memory task. Following the VPT, participants
performed a recognition memory task for the mental attribution
words from the RMET. The correct mental attribution words as
well as 76 distractor words (38 incorrect choices from the RMET
& 38 novel words not previously seen) were presented and sub-
jects answered whether they had seen the mental attribution in
the RMET task completed earlier. Responses were; 1¼Definitely
did, 2¼Probably did, 3¼Probably not, 4¼Definitely not. Scoring
was from 2 for a correct confident response through to -2 for a
confident response that was incorrect. Words were divided
according to whether they had been encoded in relation to the
‘self’ or to the ‘other’ (Barack Obama) and mean confidence
scores were calculated. Prior to testing, all subjects viewed a
short (5 min) documentary on the career of Barack Obama. To
encourage engagement with the task, subjects were told that
their responses would be compared against data collected from
people who had worked with Barack Obama.
Source memory task. If subjects responded that they had seen
the mental attribution in the eyes, they were asked a subse-
quent question ‘Was it on a male or a female face?’ Responses
were, 1¼Definitely male, 2¼Probably male, 3¼Probably female,
4¼Definitely female. Scoring was identical to the mental attri-
bution memory task. This was considered a source memory
task, as it was a measure of a contextual memory not directly
encoded in relation to the self or other.
Baseline cognitive measures
All subjects completed a battery of neurocognitive tests. After
the first session subjects completed the Mini-mental State
Examination (MMSE), The Stroop Test, The National Adult
Reading Test (NART), The Boston Naming Task, Verbal flu-
ency—phonemic and semantic, and the Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale (HADS). Following the second session, subjects
completed the following tests from the CogState: international
shopping list, identification test, one and two back tests,
set-shifting test, continuous paired associate learning test,
social–emotional cognition test and the international shopping
list—delayed recall.
Statistical analyses
All analyses were computed using JASP version 0.7.5.6. Blinding
was tested using Chi-square tests. The VAMS was first collapsed
into positive and negative valence scales. To assess potential
effects on mood ratings (VAMS), differences between pre and
post assessments were calculated for positive and negative
scales and compared between sham and active HD-tDCS ses-
sions. The VAMS and Adverse Effects were compared between
the sham and active HD-tDCS conditions using paired t-tests.
For the social cognitive tasks, the impact of HD-tDCS on the
Fig. 2. (A) Example from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) and (B) the Visual Perspective Taking Test (VPT). Subjects were required to correctly identify the
mental attribute displayed in the eyes and then how often they or Barack Obama would think or feel that way (1¼Very often, 2¼Often, 3¼Rarely, 4¼Very Rarely) and
finally the age and sex of the person (1¼Young Male, 2¼Young Female, 3¼Old Male, 4¼Old female). In the level one implicit task, subjects were instructed to answer
as quickly as possible ‘how many tennis balls do you see?’ For the VPT level one explicit self-perspective condition, subjects were required to answer either ‘how many
tennis balls can you see?’ (egocentric perspective) or ‘how many can the avatar see?’ or ‘how many does the light directly hit?’ (allocentric perspective). In the VPT level
two explicit self-perspective condition, subjects were required to answer ‘can you see more tennis balls on the left or the left or on the right?’ (egocentric perspective)
or ‘can the avatar see more on the left or the right of the road?’ or ‘does the light shine directly on more on the left or the right of the road?’ (allocentric perspective).
Incongruent scenes were those where the number of tennis balls able to be seen differed between the egocentric and allocentric perspective. In the incongruent scenes,
tennis balls were hidden behind a rubbish bin or placed behind the avatar/light.
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accuracy of emotion and age/sex judgements were analysed
using paired sample t-tests. Cohen’s d provides an estimate of
the effect size. For the VPT measures, response time differences
were analysed using repeated-measures analysis of variance
(RM-ANOVA) with congruency (congruent & incongruent), agent
(avatar & traffic light), perspective (egocentric & allocentric) and
stimulation (sham & active) as within-subject factors. If signifi-
cant, separate analyses were performed for egocentric and allo-
centric perspectives. All VPT tasks were designed to be easy,
therefore accuracy was not analysed. For the SRE task, a RM-
ANOVA with agent (self & other) and stimulation (sham &
active) as within-subject factors was used to analyse differences
in the confidence scores for episodic memories. Eta squared
provides an estimate of effect sizes for all ANOVAs. All figures
represent the means and standard error of the mean, calculated
using the Cousineau method for within-subject designs
(Cousineau, 2005). For the VPT, individual trials that were >3 s.d.
away from the mean were considered outliers and removed.
Subjects who failed to get over 50% of the trials correct in any
condition or stimulation session were excluded from the analy-
sis as it was assumed they had failed to understand the task.
This resulted in the removal of two participants from the anodal
VPT level one, one from the anodal VPT level two, four from
both the cathodal VPT level one and level two.
Results
Baseline cognitive measures
40 healthy participants in the anodal and cathodal crossover
studies were comparable with regard to demographic variables
(anodal, 10 men/10 women, mean age6SD yrs¼ 22.964.4;
cathodal, 10 men/10 women, mean age6SD yrs¼ 24.064.1,
P¼ 0.42) and cognitive profiles (see Table S1).
Social cognitive tasks
VPT: Anodal study. When required to make an egocentric judge-
ment in both the level one and two explicit VPT tasks, subjects
were slower when the allocentric perspective was incongruent
with that of the egocentric perspective, M(sd)¼ 1211.1 (242.9) v
1103.7 (227.2) msecs, F(1, 17)¼ 29.23, P< 0.001, g2¼ 0.63 and
M(sd)¼ 1500.2 (260.7) v 1335.8 (217.3) msecs, F(1, 18)¼ 43.72,
P< 0.001, g2¼ 0.71, respectively. This demonstrates that when
making an egocentric judgement, allocentric perspectives influ-
ence the response time of subjects. Similar to a previous study
(Santiesteban et al., 2014), we failed to find a greater response
time difference for scenes containing an avatar compared with a
non-agential directional control (traffic light), for level one VPT,
avatar v traffic light, mean difference (sd)¼ 62.3 (156.1) v 82.2
(115.7) msecs, F(1, 17)¼ 0.28, P¼ 0.60, g2¼ 0.02, and level two VPT
task, avatar v traffic light, mean difference (sd)¼ 80.5 (222.6) v
166.8 (168.4) msecs, F(1, 18)¼ 2.37, P¼ 0.14, g2¼ 0.12; therefore we
only tested stimulation effects for the allocentric perspective (i.e.
both avatar and light combined). Likewise, when participants
were required to take the allocentric perspective, subjects were
slower when the egocentric perspective was incongruent for both
level 1 VPT and level 2 VPT, M(sd)¼ 1545.1 (307.0) v 1359.1 (251.1),
F(1, 17)¼ 57.59, P< 0.001, g2¼ 0.77 and M(sd)¼ 1890.2 (375.8) v
1642.1 (305.3), F(1, 18)¼ 74.55, P< 0.001, g2¼ 0.81.
A significant interaction was identified between stimulation,
perspective and congruency, for both the level one VPT and
level two VPT tasks, F(1, 17)¼ 4.65, P¼ 0.046, g2¼ 0.22
and F(1, 18)¼ 4.82, P¼ 0.041, g2¼ 0.21, respectively. Follow-up
analysis demonstrated that anodal HD-tDCS to the dmPFC
increased the integration of the allocentric and egocentric
perspectives during egocentric judgements for level one VPT,
F(1, 17)¼ 5.05, P¼ 0.038, g2¼ 0.23 and level two VPT,
F(1,18)¼ 4.49, P¼ 0.048, g2¼ 0.20, as indexed by a greater differ-
ence between congruent and incongruent response times, sham
v anodal-tDCS mean difference (sd)¼ 175.9 (223.7) v 287.6 (236.8),
but not allocentric judgements, sham v anodal mean difference
(sd)¼ 392.6 (203.9) v 351.5 (287.1), F(1, 17)¼ 0.41, P¼ 0.53, g2¼ 0.02
and F(1, 18)¼ 0.35, P¼ 0.56, g2¼ 0.02, (see Figures 3 and 4).
VPT: Cathodal study. In the cathodal study, in both the level
one and level two VPT tasks, subjects were slower when the
allocentric perspective was incongruent with that of the ego-
centric perspective, M(sd)¼ 1132.9 (224.9) v 1064.8 (206.0) msecs,
F(1, 15)¼ 10.18, P¼ 0.006, g2¼ 0.40 and F(1, 15)¼ 23.44, P< 0.001,
g2¼ 0.61, respectively. Likewise, when participants were
required to take the allocentric perspective, subjects were
slower when the egocentric perspective was incongruent for
both level one VPT and level two VPT, M(sd)¼ 1553.6 (227.0) v
1403.1 (330.8) msecs, F(1, 15)¼ 12.47, P¼ 0.003, g2¼ 0.45 and
M(sd)¼ 2035.2 (377.6) v 1855.6 (462.4), F(1, 15)¼ 24.21, P< 0.001,
g2¼ 0.62, respectively.
No significant interaction was identified between stimulation,
perspective and congruency, for the level one or two VPT tasks,
F(1, 15)¼ 0.77, P¼ 0.4, g2¼ 0.05 and F(1, 15)¼ 0.22, P¼ 0.65,
g2¼ 0.01. In the follow-up analysis for egocentric judgements
only, cathodal HD-tDCS had no significant effect on the response
time for scenes where the allocentric perspective was congruent
or incongruent with that of the egocentric perspective for
level one VPT, F(1, 17)¼ 0.14, P¼ 0.72, g2¼ 0.01, and level two VPT,
F(1, 17)¼ 2.02, P¼ 0.17, g2¼ 0.11. Importantly, in the level two VPT
task, cathodal HD-tDCS had an opposite, albeit weaker, effect
compared with the anodal HD-tDCS study. This was highlighted
by a significant interaction between the study setup (anodal and
cathodal HD-tDCS) and the effect of active stimulation on the dif-
ference between response times for scenes congruent and incon-
gruent with the egocentric and allocentric perspectives, with
anodal increasing the difference and cathodal decreasing the dif-
ference during the egocentric judgements only, F(1, 36)¼ 4.92,
P¼ 0.034, g2¼ 0.13 (see Figures 3 and 4).
Implicit VPT. Prior to the explicit VPT tasks, subjects were ini-
tially instructed to only respond from the egocentric perspec-
tive. They were not made aware of the subsequent tasks and,
therefore, had no reason to be salient of the congruency of the
scene with the perspective of the avatar, hence an implicit VPT
task. Previous studies have identified that subject’s response
times are slower when the egocentric perspective is incongru-
ent with the allocentric perspective, but only when an avatar is
present and not a directional, non-agential figure such as a traf-
fic light (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Samson et al., 2010).
Replicating these results, we identified a significant difference
in response times when the egocentric perspective was incon-
gruent with the avatar M(sd)¼ 471.7(49.2) v 486.1(53.9) msec,
but not the traffic light M(sd)¼ 485.8(55.6) v 474.2(56.9) msec,
F(1, 19)¼ 38.1, P< 0.001, g2¼ 0.67. If HD-tDCS over the dmPFC
was able to influence the impact of this implicit, subconscious
processing of other agents, we would show an increase in
the response times between congruent and incongruent
scenes only when the avatar was in the scene. However, anodal
HD-tDCS had no impact on the implicit VPT effect avatar
congruent v incongruent M(sd)¼ 483.4 (78.9) v 495.5 (74.3),
traffic light congruent v incongruent¼ 500.9 (80.2) v 488.5 (73.1) ,
F(1, 19)¼ 0.04, P¼ 0.85, g2¼ 0.00, or on congruency regardless
of agent, F(1, 19)¼ 0.09, P¼ 0.77, g2¼ 0.01. Similarly, cathodal
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HD-tDCS had no impact on implicit VPT compared with sham
HD-tDCS, F(1, 19)¼ 2.26, P¼ 0.15, g2¼ 0.11.
Self-referential memory task. Recognition for previously seen
mental attributes (from the RMET) was measured using a four-
point confidence score (1¼Definitely did, 2¼ Probably did,
3¼Probably not, 4¼Definitely not). As predicted, a self-
reference effect (SRE) in episodic memory was identified during
the sham HD-tDCS condition, with greater confidence in the
recognition of self-encoded memories in comparison to other-
encoded memories, 0.90 (0.55) v 0.55 (0.75), t(19)¼ 3.18, P¼ 0.005,
Cohen’s d¼ 0.77. Following anodal HD-tDCS this bias was
removed, resulting in comparable recognition confidence for
self and other encoded items, 0.80 (0.63) v 0.76 (0.62). This was
demonstrated by a significant interaction between stimulation
Fig. 3. Reaction times for judgments based on self (egocentric) or other (allocentric) perspective in the level 1 VPT task in both the sham-controlled anodal-tDCS and
sham-controlled cathodal-tDCS studies. Response times were slower in all conditions when the perspective was incongruent between self and other. A greater integra-
tion of the allocentric perspective was identified by a significant interaction between stimulation (sham & anodal-tDCS) and congruency (congruent & incongruent)
during egocentric judgements only (‡ denotes significant interaction, P<0.05).
Fig. 4. Reaction times for judgments based on self (egocentric) or other (allocentric) perspective in the level 2 VPT task in both the sham-controlled anodal-tDCS and
sham-controlled cathodal-tDCS studies. Response times were slower in all conditions when the perspective was incongruent between self and other. A greater integra-
tion of the allocentric perspective was identified by a significant interaction between stimulation (sham & anodal-tDCS) and congruency (congruent & incongruent)
during egocentric judgments only (‡ denotes significant interaction, P<0.05).
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and agent, F(1, 19)¼ 4.73, P¼ 0.04, g2¼ 0.20 (see Figure 5) and the
removal of the SRE, t(19)¼0.40, P¼ 0.70, Cohen’s d¼ 0.09.
However, in the cathodal HD-tDCS study there was no effect of
active stimulation, and a bias remained towards memories
encoded in relation to the self, F(1, 19)¼0.13, P¼ 0.72, g2¼ 0.01. It
is interesting to note that although not significant, the direction
of effect moved in the opposite direction, with cathodal HD-
tDCS resulting in a slightly greater bias towards self-encoded
memories, sham: self 0.69 (0.59) other 0.56 (0.75); cathodal 0.78
(0.53) other 0.49 (0.64) (see Figure 5).
In the source memory condition, we assessed whether the
effects were specific to items encoded in relation to the self
or other (mental attributions) or whether other aspects of
the memory were also affected (gender of the source).
We demonstrate specificity to the mental attribution terms, as
indicated by a lack of anodal HD-tDCS effects on confidence of
gender scores sham: self 0.61 (0.36) other 0.65 (0.48); anodal: self
0.72 (0.39) other 0.72 (0.34); F(1, 19)¼ 0.08, P¼ 0.78, g2¼ 0, nor for
cathodal HD-tDCS sham: self 0.72 (0.48) other 0.38 (0.53); catho-
dal: self 0.58 (0.50) other 0.61 (0.60), F(1, 19)¼ 3.74, P¼ 0.07,
g2¼ 0.16.
RMET. As predicted there were no effects of anodal HD-tDCS on
the accuracy of mental state attribution on the RMET (27.95 v
28.00), t(19)¼ -0.07, P¼ 0.95, Cohen’s d¼ -0.02, although a significant
decrease in accuracy on the age and sex judgements was identified
(33.45 v 32.3), t(19)¼ 2.44, P¼ 0.03, Cohen’s d¼ 0.55. Cathodal HD-
tDCS had no impact on either the attribution of mental states
(27.05 v 26.65), t(19)¼ 0.77, P¼ 0.45, Cohen’s d¼ 0.18, or the judge-
ment of age and sex (32.45 v 31.55), t(19)¼ 1.02, P¼ 0.32, Cohen’s
d¼ 0.23 (see Supplementary Figure S1).
Adverse effects and blinding
All participants tolerated the stimulation well with only minor
physical sensations. Self-reported mild adverse effects and
mood (Brunoni et al., 2011; Folstein and Luria, 1973) were com-
parable between the stimulation conditions (see Tables S2 and
S3). Subjects guessed the stimulation order at chance level in
both the anodal (number of correct guesses: 11/20, P¼ 0.65), and
cathodal HD-tDCS studies (number of correct guesses: 7/20
P¼ 0.18). This demonstrates that our behavioural stimulation
effects were not affected by those variables.
Discussion
The ability to integrate and also distinguish information per-
taining to the self and other is fundamental in social cognition
and thought to rely on the dmPFC. In the first study of its kind,
we examined the impact of anodal and cathodal HD-tDCS over
the dmPFC on a range of social cognitive tasks that pose differ-
ent demands on self-other processing. Our results provide the
first causal evidence that the dmPFC is involved in tasks requir-
ing an explicit distinction between the self and other. Moreover,
the results suggest that the dmPFC is specifically involved in
higher-order social cognition involving the integration of infor-
mation pertaining to others.
Integrating the perspective of the other into that of the self
was apparent in both explicit VPT tasks. Specifically, anodal
HD-tDCS increased the response time differences between con-
gruent and incongruent scenes when the subject made a judge-
ment from the egocentric perspective (self-perspective) in both
level one and two explicit VPT tasks. Anodal HD-tDCS over the
dmPFC also removed the SRE in memory. These distinct tasks
both rely on weighting self and other information in order to
judge a scene in the present or recall details from the past.
Anodal HD-tDCS to the dmPFC integrated the other perspective
into that of the self and removed the implicit bias for self-
encoded items, suggesting a causal role in the integration of
other oriented cognitive processes regardless of the cognitive
domain. This blurring of the self-other divide has no impact on
the ability to accurately attribute mental states from the eyes
suggesting that other cognitive processes and underlying brain
structures are involved (Schurz et al., 2014). The lack of any
effect in the implicit VPT or on the source memory task, sug-
gests that the dmPFC is only involved in explicit demands on
self-other processing. Although cathodal HD-tDCS by itself had
no significant effect on any of the tasks, overall we observed
trends in the opposite direction. The weaker effects of cathodal
stimulation are consistent with other cognitive tDCS studies
and may reflect the contribution of compensatory systems buf-
fering the impact of inhibitory stimulation to a specific region
(Jacobson et al., 2012). Alternatively, reduced cognitive effects
may be due to differences in the ability to affect neuronal activ-
ity, possibly due to the opposing polarisation of the soma and
dendrites, tending to cancel out each other during cathodal
stimulation (Lafon et al., 2016).
The dmPFC is a region associated with cognitive control, with
consistent evidence of activation in tasks involving conflict
detection or strategic control (Botvinick et al., 1999; Carter et al.,
1998). Therefore, stimulating the dmPFC may exert greater cogni-
tive control over a default implicit bias in favour of self-relevant
information as observed in the SRE. The specific effects on the
egocentric perspective judgments provide further evidence for
dmPFC involvement in regulating self-processing. There is exten-
sive functional and structural connectivity between the dmPFC
and vmPFC (Price et al., 1996), a region associated with emotional,
Fig. 5. Mean confidence scores for items recognised in the memory test. A self-reference effect (SRE) was evident during sham stimulation (*P<0.05). A significant inter-
action between stimulation (sham & anodal-tDCS) and encoding context (self & other) was identified, such that anodal tDCS removed the SRE in recognition confidence
(‡ denotes significant interaction, P< 0.05). Cathodal-tDCS had no effect on the SRE in memory.
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interoceptive and self processing (D’Argembeau, 2013; Northoff,
2012). As the dmPFC has also been implicated in higher-order
processing such as metarepresentation and integration of infor-
mation (Coricelli and Nagel, 2009; Hampton et al., 2008; Yoshida
et al., 2010) stimulating the dmPFC may increase the integration
of information that would otherwise be processed in parallel to
those important for self-relevant processes (Nicolle et al., 2012).
This embedding of information pertaining to the other could
potentially explain how humans are able to represent the per-
spective of others and attribute observable behaviour to unob-
servable mental attributes.
In a previous study, anodal tDCS to the right TPJ increased the
control of self and other representation using a VPT task and an
inhibition of imitation task (Santiesteban et al., 2012). This sug-
gests dissociation between the role of the TPJ and the dmPFC
within the ‘social brain’. The results suggest that the TPJ is
involved in controlling self and other representations and the
dmPFC is involved in integrating information from the other into
that of the self. Further studies directly comparing dmPFC and
TPJ stimulation using the same tasks are required to test this dis-
sociation. In regards to ToM, stimulating the left or right TPJ
(Santiesteban et al., 2015) had no impact on the accuracy of attrib-
uting mental states and this was also the case with dmPFC stim-
ulation. In the current study tDCS actually reduced
performance on the lower level age and sex judgement compo-
nent of the RMET. Although the dmPFC is associated with the
RMET early in development, there is a significant reduction in
activation by mid-adolescence (Overgaauw et al., 2015). This is
likely due to the reduced demands on metarepresentational cog-
nitive processes needed to integrate or distinguish other from
self in the case of determining mental states from the eyes.
Biophysical models of current flow suggested that HD-
compared with conventional tDCS set-ups results in more focal
current flow (Bortoletto et al., 2016; Kuo et al., 2013) and impacts
cognition in a regionally specific way (Gbadeyan et al., 2016a).
However, aside from current modelling studies, little is known
about the distribution and extent of HD-tDCS effects on brain
physiology. Importantly, even more focal stimulation may result
in modulation of functionally connected distant brain regions as
suggested for conventional tDCS (Meinzer et al., 2012; Stagg et al.,
2013). Similarly, the dmPFC refers to a large frontal region with
both cortical and deeper midline components. The extent which
HD-tDCS influences this region is currently unknown. As HD-
tDCS is suitable for use simultaneously with fMRI (Gbadeyan et al.,
2016c), future studies using this method will provide insight into
the mechanisms underlying the cognitive effects demonstrated
in the current study (Meinzer et al., 2013; Meinzer et al., 2014).
As well as furthering our understanding of the social brain
and the contribution of the dmPFC to VPT and self-referential
memory, the study has implications for other avenues of
research. For example, HD-tDCS may provide a valuable techni-
que for improving the outcome of cognitive training programs
in clinical groups who experience specific social difficulties,
such as schizophrenia and autism (Iacoboni, 2006; van der
Weiden et al., 2015). It may also be applicable across the healthy
lifespan (Perceval et al., 2016), with older adults having reduced
social cognitive capacity coupled with alterations in dmPFC
structure and function (Moran et al., 2012; Sowell et al., 2003).
Simultaneous HD-tDCS and fMRI while completing tasks requir-
ing self and other processing will allow for the direct analysis of
the selective effects of HD-tDCS to the dmPFC and elaborate on
the results of the current study, revealing a specific causal role
for the dmPFC in integrating information from others into that
of the self in human social cognition.
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Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
Funding
This work was supported by a Future Fellowship grant
[FT120100608] and a strategic seed-funding grant from the
University of Queensland, awarded to Marcus Meinzer.
Conflict of interest. None declared.
Author contributions
A.K.M. & M.M. conceived the experiment. A.K.M., M.M. & I.D.
designed the experiment. A.K.M. & S.R. collected the data.
A.K.M. analysed the data. A.K.M. wrote the manuscript. I.D.,
S.R., & M.M. edited the manuscript.
References
Adolphs, R. (2009). The social brain: neural basis of social knowl-
edge. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 693–716.
Alam, M., Truong, D.Q., Khadka, N., Bikson, M. (2016). Spatial and
polarity precision of concentric high-definition transcranial
direct current stimulation (HD-tDCS). Physics in Medicine and
Biology, 61(12), 4506–21.
Amodio, D.M., Frith, C.D. (2006). Meeting of minds: the medial
frontal cortex and social cognition. Nature Reviews Neuroscience,
7(4), 268–77.
Apperly, I.A., Butterfill, S.A. (2009). Do humans have two systems
to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review,
116(4), 953–70.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., Plumb, I.
(2001). The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test revised ver-
sion: a study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger
syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 42(2), 241–51.
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Skinner, R., Martin, J., Clubley,
E. (2001). The autism-spectrum quotient (AQ): evidence from
Asperger syndrome/high-functioning autism, males and
females, scientists and mathematicians. Journal of Autism and
Developmental Disorders, 31(1), 5–17.
Bortoletto, M., Rodella, C., Salvador, R., Miranda, P.C., Miniussi, C.
(2016). Reduced current spread by concentric electrodes in
transcranial electrical stimulation (tES). Brain Stimulation, 9(4),
525–8.
Botvinick, M., Nystrom, L.E., Fissell, K., Carter, C.S., Cohen, J.D.
(1999). Conflict monitoring versus selection-for-action in ante-
rior cingulate cortex. Nature, 402(6758), 179–81.
Brosch, T., Schiller, D., Mojdehbakhsh, R., Uleman, J.S., Phelps,
E.A. (2013). Neural mechanisms underlying the integration of
situational information into attribution outcomes. Social
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 8(6), 640–6.
Brunoni, A.R., Amadera, J., Berbel, B., Volz, M.S., Rizzerio, B.G.,
Fregni, F. (2011). A systematic review on reporting and
assessment of adverse effects associated with transcranial
direct current stimulation. International Journal of
Neuropsychopharmacology, 14(8), 1133–45.
Carter, C.S., Braver, T.S., Barch, D.M., Botvinick, M.M., Noll, D.,
Cohen, J.D. (1998). Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and
the online monitoring of performance. Science, 280(5364), 747–9.
Cialdini, R.B., Brown, S.L., Lewis, B.P., Luce, C., Neuberg, S.L.
(1997). Reinterpreting the empathy-altruism relationship:






/scan/article-abstract/12/8/1209/3746634 by guest on 04 February 2020
when one into one equals oneness. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 73(3), 481–94.
Coricelli, G., Nagel, R. (2009). Neural correlates of depth of strate-
gic reasoning in medial prefrontal cortex. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America,
106(23), 9163–8.
Cousineau, D. (2005). Confidence intervals in within-subject
designs: a simpler solution to Loftus and Masson’s method.
Tutorials for Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 1(1), 42–5.
D’Argembeau, A. (2013). On the role of the ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex in self-processing: the valuation hypothesis.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 372.
Decety, J., Sommerville, J.A. (2003). Shared representations
between self and other: a social cognitive neuroscience view.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(12), 527–33.
Denny, B.T., Kober, H., Wager, T.D., Ochsner, K.N. (2012). A meta-
analysis of functional neuroimaging studies of self- and other
judgments reveals a spatial gradient for mentalizing in medial
prefrontal cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(8), 1742–52.
Ferrari, C., Lega, C., Vernice, M., et al. (2016). The dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex plays a causal role in integrating social
impressions from faces and verbal descriptions. Cerebral
Cortex, 26(1), 156–65.
Flavell, J.H. (1977). The development of knowledge about visual
perception. Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 25, 43–76.
Folstein, M.F., Luria, R. (1973). Reliability, validity, and clinical
application of the Visual Analogue Mood Scale. Psychological
Medicine, 3(4), 479–86.
Frith, C.D., Frith, U. (2008). Implicit and explicit processes in
social cognition. Neuron, 60(3), 503–10.
Gbadeyan, O., McMahon, K., Steinhauser, M., Meinzer, M.
(2016a). Stimulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex enhances
adaptive cognitive control: a high-definition transcranial
direct current stimulation study. Journal of Neuroscience, 36(50),
12530–6.
Gbadeyan, O., McMahon, K., Steinhauser, M., Meinzer, M.
(2016b). Stimulation of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex enhances
adaptive cognitive control: a high-definition transcranial
direct current stimulation study. Journal of Neuroscience, in
press.
Gbadeyan, O., Steinhauser, M., McMahon, K., Meinzer, M. (2016c).
Safety, tolerability, blinding efficacy and behavioural effects of
a novel MRI-compatible, high-definition tDCS set-up. Brain
Stimulation, 9(4), 545–52.
Gzesh, S.M., Surber, C.F. (1985). Visual perspective-taking skills
in children. Child Development, 56(5), 1204–13.
Hamilton, A.F., Brindley, R., Frith, U. (2009). Visual perspective
taking impairment in children with autistic spectrum disorder.
Cognition, 113(1), 37–44.
Hampton, A.N., Bossaerts, P., O’Doherty, J.P. (2008). Neural
correlates of mentalizing-related computations during stra-
tegic interactions in humans. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 105(18),
6741–6.
Hogeveen, J., Grafman, J., Aboseria, M., David, A., Bikson, M.,
Hauner, K.K. (2016). Effects of high-definition and conventional
tDCS on response inhibition. Brain Stimulation, 9(5), 720–9
doi:10.1016/j.brs.2016.04.015.
Iacoboni, M. (2006). Failure to deactivate in autism: the co-
constitution of self and other. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
10(10), 431–3.
Jacobson, L., Koslowsky, M., Lavidor, M. (2012). tDCS polarity
effects in motor and cognitive domains: a meta-analytical
review. Experimental Brain Research, 216(1), 1–10.
Kuo, H.I., Bikson, M., Datta, A., et al. (2013). Comparing cortical
plasticity induced by conventional and high-definition 4 1 ring
tDCS: a neurophysiological study. Brain Stimulation, 6(4), 644–8.
Lafon, B., Rahman, A., Biksom, M., Parra, L.C. (2016). Direct cur-
rent stimulation alters neuronal input/output. Brain
Stimulation, in press
Meinzer, M., Antonenko, D., Lindenberg, R., et al. (2012). Electrical
brain stimulation improves cognitive performance by modu-
lating functional connectivity and task-specific activation.
Journal of Neuroscience, 32(5), 1859–66.
Meinzer, M., Lindenberg, R., Antonenko, D., Flaisch, T., Floel, A.
(2013). Anodal transcranial direct current stimulation tempo-
rarily reverses age-associated cognitive decline and functional
brain activity changes. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(30), 12470–8.
Meinzer, M., Lindenberg, R., Darkow, R., Ulm, L., Copland, D.,
Floel, A. (2014). Transcranial direct current stimulation and
simultaneous functional magnetic resonance imaging. Journal
of Visualized Experiments 86, e51730. doi:10.3791/51730.
Moll, H., Tomasello, M. (2004). 12- and 18-month-old infants fol-
low gaze to spaces behind barriers. Developmental Science, 7(1),
F1–9.
Moran, J.M., Jolly, E., Mitchell, J.P. (2012). Social-cognitive deficits
in normal aging. Journal of Neuroscience, 32(16), 5553–61.
Nicolle, A., Klein-Flugge, M.C., Hunt, L.T., Vlaev, I., Dolan, R.J.,
Behrens, T.E. (2012). An agent independent axis for executed
and modeled choice in medial prefrontal cortex. Neuron, 75(6),
1114–21.
Northoff, G. (2012). From emotions to consciousness – a neuro-
phenomenal and neuro-relational approach. Frontiers in
Psychology, 3, 303.
Oakley, B.F., Brewer, R., Bird, G., Catmur, C. (2016). Theory of
mind is not theory of emotion: a cautionary note on the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 125(6), 818–23.
Overgaauw, S., van Duijvenvoorde, A.C., Gunther Moor, B.,
Crone, E.A. (2015). A longitudinal analysis of neural regions
involved in reading the mind in the eyes. Social Cognitive and
Affective Neuroscience, 10(5), 619–27.
Perceval, G., Floel, A., Meinzer, M. (2016). Can transcranial direct
current stimulation counteract age-associated functional
impairment? Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 65, 157–72.
Price, J.L., Carmichael, S.T., Drevets, W.C. (1996). Networks
related to the orbital and medial prefrontal cortex; a substrate
for emotional behavior? Progress in Brain Research, 107, 523–36.
Rilling, J.K., Sanfey, A.G., Aronson, J.A., Nystrom, L.E., Cohen, J.D.
(2004). The neural correlates of theory of mind within interper-
sonal interactions. NeuroImage, 22(4), 1694–703.
Samson, D., Apperly, I.A., Braithwaite, J.J., Andrews, B.J., Bodley
Scott, S.E. (2010). Seeing it their way: evidence for rapid and
involuntary computation of what other people see. Journal of
Experimental Psychology:Human Perception & Performance, 36(5),
1255–66.
Santiesteban, I., Banissy, M.J., Catmur, C., Bird, G. (2012).
Enhancing social ability by stimulating right temporoparietal
junction. Current Biology, 22(23), 2274–7.
Santiesteban, I., Banissy, M.J., Catmur, C., Bird, G. (2015).
Functional lateralization of temporoparietal junction – imita-
tion inhibition, visual perspective-taking and theory of mind.
European Journal of Neuroscience, 42(5), 2527–33. doi:10.1111/
ejn.13036
Santiesteban, I., Catmur, C., Hopkins, S.C., Bird, G., Heyes, C.
(2014). Avatars and arrows: implicit mentalizing or domain-
general processing? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception & Performance, 40(3), 929–37.






/scan/article-abstract/12/8/1209/3746634 by guest on 04 February 2020
Schurz, M., Kronbichler, M., Weissengruber, S., Surtees, A.,
Samson, D., Perner, J. (2015). Clarifying the role of theory of
mind areas during visual perspective taking: issues of sponta-
neity and domain-specificity. NeuroImage, 117, 386–96.
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., Perner, J. (2014).
Fractionating theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain
imaging studies. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 42, 9–34.
Sellaro, R., Nitsche, M.A., Colzato, L.S. (2016). The stimulated
social brain: effects of transcranial direct current stimulation
on social cognition. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1369(1), 218–39.
Sowell, E.R., Peterson, B.S., Thompson, P.M., Welcome, S.E.,
Henkenius, A.L., Toga, A.W. (2003). Mapping cortical change
across the human life span. Nature Neuroscience, 6(3), 309–15.
Stagg, C.J., Lin, R.L., Mezue, M., et al. (2013). Widespread modula-
tion of cerebral perfusion induced during and after transcra-
nial direct current stimulation applied to the left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 33(28), 11425–31.
Symons, C.S., Johnson, B.T. (1997). The self-reference effect
in memory: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 371–94.
Tversky, B., Hard, B.M. (2009). Embodied and disembodied cogni-
tion: spatial perspective-taking. Cognition, 110(1), 124–9.
van der Weiden, A., Prikken, M., van Haren, N.E. (2015). Self-other
integration and distinction in schizophrenia: a theoretical
analysis and a review of the evidence. Neuroscience &
Biobehavioral Reviews, 57, 220–37.
Van Overwalle, F., Vandekerckhove, M. (2013). Implicit and
explicit social mentalizing: dual processes driven by a shared
neural network. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 560.
Volz, K.G., Kessler, T., von Cramon, D.Y. (2009). In-group as part
of the self: in-group favoritism is mediated by medial prefron-
tal cortex activation. Society for Neuroscience, 4(3), 244–60.
Wittmann, M.K., Kolling, N., Faber, N.S., Scholl, J., Nelissen, N.,
Rushworth, M.F. (2016). Self-other mergence in the frontal cor-
tex during cooperation and competition. Neuron, 91(2), 482–93.
Yoshida, W., Seymour, B., Friston, K.J., Dolan, R.J. (2010). Neural
mechanisms of belief inference during cooperative games.
Journal of Neuroscience, 30(32), 10744–51.
Zigmond, A.S., Snaith, R.P. (1983). The hospital anxiety and
depression scale. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67(6), 361–70.






/scan/article-abstract/12/8/1209/3746634 by guest on 04 February 2020
